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ABSTRACT 
In December of 2015, the Department of Defense announced its decision to allow women into 
combat roles. Many applauded this decision as a huge victory for gender equality in the United 
States. However, there still remains one formal barrier to gender equality in the U.S. military, 
the bar on female registration for the draft. This comment will argue that in order for American 
women to share the burdens of citizenship with their male peers, they must also be required to 
register for the draft. However, this comment will also argue that in order to protect the important 
State interest in the wellbeing of children and families, a parenthood exception should be added 
to allow both mothers and fathers to opt out of registering with the Selective Service System. To 
do so would respect the mandates of the Equal Protection clause, allow women to share the burden 
of citizenship, and protect children and families. 
This comment will compare the United States and Israeli militaries, and will engage in a 
comparative analysis of equality principles in each nation’s legal system. In making these 
comparisons, the comment will highlight how the Israeli system of conscription and legal principles 
of equality do little to further equality for Israeli women in the military. This will show why the 
U.S. should not distinguish between men and women when it comes to the draft. It will also show 
why the Equal Protection clause mandates registration requirements for both men and women. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Women’s service in the military has always been a point of 
contention in American society. Most recently, the debate flared over 
whether women should be allowed into the military’s combat arms 
positions. Those in favor saw it as another major step towards 
women’s equality in the United States and a way to recognize the 
hundreds of women who have served in such roles informally since 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 That debate largely ended in 
December of 2015 when the Department of Defense announced its 
decision to fully integrate the United States military and allow women 
into combat roles.2 However, the Selective Service System still remains 
a formal barrier to gender equality in the United States military. 
The Selective Service System has undergone many changes 
throughout U.S. history.3 However, the Selective Service System, as it 
is known today, was formed in 1980 under the Military Selective 
Service Act (“MSSA”).4 The Act requires all male citizens, and 
residents of the United States, between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-six to register with the Selective Service System—an 
independent agency that oversees registration and implementation of 
the draft.5 However, the United States has not drafted a man into 
                                               
1 Erin R. Goldberg, A Sisterhood of Arms: Envisioning Conscription and Selective Service 
Post-Gender Integration of Combat Arms, 64 BUFFALO L. REV. 1135 (2016). See also 
Gabrielle Fromer, With Equal Opportunity Comes Equal Responsibility: The 
Unconstitutionality of a Male-Only Draft, GEO. J. GENDER & L. 173, 194 (2017). 
(discussing women’s roles in combat during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
 2 Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1137. 
 3 Fromer, supra note 1, at 180-82. 
 4 Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3801 (2016) (West, Westlaw 
through Pub. 114-254), Formerly cited as 50 App. USC § 451. See also Goldberg, supra 
note 1, at 1143. 
 5 Fromer, supra note 1, at 182. 
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military service since 1972,6 making the Selective Service System largely 
a symbolic requirement of full citizenship.7 
In theory, the purpose of the Selective Service System is to 
“provide military manpower in a manner that is administratively 
manageable.”8 But the Selective Service System and the draft also serve 
two further purposes. First, the draft is supposed to instill a civic 
responsibility in American men and is a means for men to fulfill their 
“moral responsibility” to serve their country.9 Second, the Selective 
Service System is a way to connect the civilian world to the military, 
grounding the military institution to make it more tangible for the 
average American male.10 As General George S. Patton put it, “[t]he 
soldier is the Army. No army is better than its soldiers. The soldier is 
also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship 
is that of bearing arms for one’s country.”11 By excluding women from 
draft availability and Selective Service registration, the government is 
                                               
 6 Elizabeth Farrington, Gender-Selective Service: The History and Future of Women 
and the Draft, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279 (2017). See also William A. 
Kamens, Selective Disservice: The Indefensible Discrimination of Draft Registration, 52 AM. U. 
L. REV. 703, 705, 707 (2003), discussing the unlikelihood of the United States 
reinstituting a draft since no draft has been declared since Selective Service 
registration began again in 1981. 
 7 Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 104 (2008). See also Dunn, The Military’s 
Selective Service Act’s Exemption of Women, at 10, (quoting Memorandum from General 
David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense 
(Dec. 4, 1981)) (“the act of registration has tended to remind [young men] . . . of the 
obligation of citizenship and helps to rekindle pride in service and country.”). 
 8 Maj. Scott E. Dunn, The Military Selective Service Act’s Exemption of Women: It 
is Time to End it, 2009-APR ARMLAW 1, 9 (2009). 
 9 Id. at 12. 
 10 Id. See also Leah Kaufman, We Want You: Constitutionality of Conscription in 
the United States and Israel, 37 WHITTIER L. REV. 193, 202 (2016) (discussing how the 
volunteer-based military has created a disconnect between those who serve and the 
American public and how some form of compulsory service may remedy this 
disconnect). 
 11 Renee Just, GI Jane: A Comparison of the Legal Framework for Women’s Military 
Service in Israel and the United States, 8 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L. J. 165 (2017) 
(quoting General George S. Patton). 
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signaling to women that their moral obligation to public service is not 
as important as that of their male counterparts.12 
Furthermore, the Department of Defense has acknowledged 
that there is no military reason for not registering women for the 
draft.13 At the time the Supreme Court first examined women’s draft 
exclusion in Rostker v. Goldberg,14 “the Department of Defense already 
recognized the need for draft-eligible support personnel and had 
recognized women’s ability to fill these roles.”15 Yet despite this 
support, paternalistic views that women were the weaker sex, best 
suited for domestic life prevailed and the challenge to women’s draft 
exclusion was rejected.16 
In contrast to women’s draft exclusion in the American 
military, Israel’s service requirements and exemptions provide a strong 
example of why American service laws should not distinguish between 
men and women. “From an international perspective, Israel presents 
an iconic view of women soldiers and the progressive inclusion of 
women in the military.”17 Like the United States, Israel allows women 
into most combat positions, and more significantly, has a longstanding 
practice of conscripting both men and women into armed service.18 
However, due to how the service laws in Israel distinguish between 
men and women, as of 2011, only thirty-three percent of the Israel 
                                               
 12 See Fromer, supra note 1, at 193 (arguing that exclusion from Selective 
Service registration sends the message that women are subordinate to men due to 
their gender). 
 13 Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1156. 
 14 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 15 Id. at 1155. 
 16 See id. at 1147. 
 17 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Cross-Dressers with Benefits: Female Combat Soldiers in 
the United States and Israel, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 323-24 (2012). 
 18 Catherine Powell, Another Barrier Falls: United States Joins Group of Countries 
That Open Doors to Women in Combat, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 17, 
2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/another-barrier-falls-united-states-joins-group-
countries-open-doors-women-combat. Some commentators have even described the 
conscription of women into the IDF as a social anomaly in Israel. Guy I. Seidman & 
Eyal A. Nun, Women, The Military and the Court: Israel at 2001, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 91, 94 (2001). 
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Defense Force (“IDF”) is female.19 This disparity between female and 
male service in the IDF, despite service obligations for both, is due to 
the shorter service obligations for women and the many exemptions 
available to them to avoid mandatory service.20 Such exemptions are in 
place to protect women’s roles as mothers, but instead of protecting 
women, such exemptions work to their detriment. 
Therefore, this comment will argue that in order for American 
women to achieve full citizenship they must be required to register 
with Selective Service System and be subject to the draft, like their male 
peers. However, in order to protect the important State interest in the 
wellbeing of children and families, this comment will also argue that a 
parenthood exception should be added to allow both mothers and 
fathers to opt out of registering with the Selective Service System. To 
do so will give full weight to the Equal Protection Clause, allow women 
to share the burden of citizenship, and protect children and families. 
In Part II, I will discuss the respective militaries of Israel and 
the United States. I will examine the histories of each nation’s military, 
the role of women in the militaries, seminal cases regarding women’s 
roles in the military, and the aftermath of such cases. In Part III, I will 
examine the principles of equality that can be found in both U.S. and 
Israeli law and how interpretations of equality developed in each 
nation. In Part IV, I will argue why the Equal Protection Clause 
mandates that women register with the Selective Service System and 
why a parenthood exemption would be in the best interest of the State, 
as well as why such an exemption must be applied to both mothers 
and fathers in order to avoid discriminatory results, like the ones seen 
in Israel. 
                                               
 19 Powell, supra note 18. See also Ukeles, supra note 17, at 324 (“Although 
legally permitted to engage in even direct combat roles, Israeli women very rarely 
engage in combat support roles, are completely absent as infantry, and have advanced 
insignificantly in military leadership.”), 
 20 Powell, supra note 18. See also Daphne Barak-Erez, The Feminist Battle for 
Citizenship: Between Combat Duties and Conscientious Objection, 13 CARDOZO J. L. & 
GENDER 531, 533 (2007). 
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II. ISRAEL’S AND THE UNITED STATES’ MILITARIES 
A. The Israeli Military 
1. History of the Israeli Defense Force 
Two weeks after Israel declared its independence, and in the 
height of the War of Independence, the Israeli Defense Force (“IDF”) 
was created on May 26, 1948.21 The founding document declared that 
the IDF would be Israel’s military force and required that all IDF 
soldiers pledge their allegiance to the protection of Israel, similar to the 
oath given to American soldiers when enlisting.22 The founding 
document of the IDF is significant because until that time, the War of 
Independence was being fought by various paramilitary groups 
without a clear organizing structure.23 The creation of the founding 
document therefore dissolved those groups and united them all under 
the direction and coordination of the IDF.24 
It was not until the War of Independence was won that the 
Defense Service Law was passed, which detailed the recruitment 
protocols and service exemptions for the IDF.25 At the time, the 
Defense Service Law was seen as revolutionary because it made 
military service mandatory for both men and women.26 However, the 
law was not a complete commitment to gender equality due to the 
special exemptions and shorter service requirements provided for 
women.27 In essence, the Defense Service Law has remained largely 
the same since its enactment with several amendments throughout the 
years, with the current version of the law seeing its last revision in 
1986.28 
                                               
 21 Kaufman, supra note 10, at 203. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 203-04. 
 26 Barak-Erez, supra note 20, 534. 
 27 Id. at 534-35. 
 28 Kaufman, supra note 10, at 204. 
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In practice, there are three different categories of military 
service under the Defense Service Law: entry level or compulsory 
service, the reserves, and professional or technical service.29 At the 
entry level, service is set by statute, mandating three years of service 
for men and two years for women,30 beginning once the individual 
turns 18.31 However, mandatory service is not universal because the 
statute only conscripts Jewish men and women.32 Further, men 
comprise most of the conscripts, constituting about two-thirds of 
those who are conscripted.33 
After this initial entry level, soldiers can be discharged from the 
IDF having completed their military service.34 Most men, however, are 
given the opportunity to be moved to reserve units and to be called 
upon periodically based on the needs of the IDF—an opportunity not 
typically afforded to women.35 In addition to the option to serve in the 
reserve forces, some soldiers, based on their perceived usefulness to 
the IDF, are asked to continue their service in the professional or 
technical area of the IDF.36 
The significance of the professional or technical area of the 
military for women is twofold. First, it can act as an equalizer between 
men and women in reducing the effects of the unequal terms of 
service. Second, service in the professional army is typically for full pay; 
meaning women can make more money than they would in the civilian 
sector and begin earning it before their male peers.37 
It is also important to note the significance of the IDF in Israeli 
society. The IDF is central to Israeli society because, since its 
inception, Israel has been surrounded by countries that pose serious 
and consistent military threats.38 Given this security situation, Israel 
                                               
 29 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 95. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Just, supra note 11, at 177. 
 32 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 97-98. 
 33 Just, supra note 11, at 177. 
 34 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 99. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 100. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Kaufman, supra note 10, at 205. 
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will likely always be heavily reliant on a large number of soldiers.39 
Therefore, it is essential to integrate Israeli youths into society through 
military service because “without each and every one of them, Israel 
would not be able to defend itself successfully against attacks.”40 
Further, “[t]he close identification of the military with the State gives 
the military the kind of influence and privilege rarely enjoyed by other 
social institutions.”41 For many draftees military service, in particular, 
service in combat units, helps to further their political and private 
careers and is often a ticket “to elite status in Israeli political, public, 
and business circles.”42 Therefore, the different terms of service 
between men and women can have ramifications that reach beyond 
their military service.43 
2. The Role of Women in the Israeli Military 
a. The History of Women’s Service in the IDF 
Whether formally or informally, Israeli women have served in 
the armed forces since before the inception of the Israeli State, most 
notably during the War of Independence.44 Yet despite this tradition 
of service, at the end of the War of Independence, a debate waged on 
whether there was a place for women in the IDF.45 The debate resulted 
in a compromise. In 1949 it was determined that women would be 
conscripted along with their male peers, 46 but there would be a number 
                                               
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 113. 
 42 Id. at 113-114. 
 43 ”Many [soldiers] establish contacts or networks in the army that lead to 
jobs and careers. . . . As a result, military service has taken on enormous importance 
in the professional lives of Israeli citizens who essentially begin their careers in the 
military institution.” Leora F. Eisenstadt, Privileged but Equal? A Comparison of U.S. and 
Israeli Notions of Sex Equality in Employment Law, 40 Vand, J. Transnat’l L. 357, 377 
(2007). 
 44 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 111. 
 45 Id. at 111-12. 
 46 Id. at 112 (“[T]he main reason for the somewhat surprising decision to 
integrate women in most units of the military . . . was the extreme manpower 
shortage during the War of Independence.”). 
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of exemptions available to women to opt out of service so that their 
place as wives and mothers could be protected.47 
While women could not be conscripted into combat roles, 
theoretically women could volunteer for such positions.48 However, 
such an option was not seen in practice.49 In reality, women were 
placed to auxiliary roles, like clerical staff, with a few positions in 
technical and professional roles.50 The shorter service terms—the 
special limitations placed on women’s service—”affect[ed] their 
chances of inclusion and promotion in the standing army.”51 While the 
special exemptions were put in place to protect women’s essential roles 
as mothers, in reality, those privileges worked to the detriment of 
women’s inclusion in the military.52 
In the 1970s and 1980s, some progress was made towards 
equalizing women’s status in the military.53 The IDF began placing 
women into instructor positions where they would teach classes of 
male combat soldiers, in particular classes involving technical duties 
that typically dealt with missiles, artillery, and armor.54 Women were 
also placed as simulator instructors, where they were given the 
opportunity to teach air and naval combat soldiers.55 However, these 
changes were made with the intention to free up more men to fill 
combat roles.56 In essence, up until the 1990s, women’s service in the 
IDF was dictated by practical considerations; when women were 
                                               
 47 Id. In order to protect women’s primary duty to serve as wives and 
mothers, women are exempted from mandatory service if they are married, mothers, 
or pregnant, as well as exemptions from service for conscientious objection. 
Eisenstadt, supra note 43, at 378. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 540. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Eisenstadt, supra note 43, at 378-79. 
 53 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 114. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
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needed, they were called up, and when not needed, women were largely 
sheltered from the burdens of service.57 
b. Miller v. Minister of Defense 
The first major challenge to women’s exclusion from combat 
roles in the Israeli armed forces came in Miller v. Minister of Defense.58 
Up until Miller, women soldiers typically served in clerical roles and 
occasionally in technical and professional roles.59 In particular, it had 
been the IDF’s policy to not allow women into combat roles, like the 
prestigious pilots course for the Israeli Air Force, regardless of their 
qualifications.60 In 1993, despite this policy, Alice Miller hoped to 
volunteer for the pilots course.61 At that time, Miller already possessed 
a South African pilot’s license and was studying aerospace engineering 
at Israeli Institute for Technology. This arguably made her qualified to 
serve in the Israeli Air Force.62 However, the IDF denied Miller’s 
application, stating that fighter-pilots fell under the category of combat 
positions forbidden to women.63 
In response, Miller appealed to the High Court of Justice, the 
Israeli equivalent of the Supreme Court. Miller sought an injunction 
that would require the military authorities to allow her to take the tests 
necessary to enter the pilots course, and upon passage, enter the 
course.64 Essentially, Miller was not attacking any fundamental 
legislation, simply the military policy of exclusion.65 The military, 
                                               
 57 Id. 
 58 HCJ 4541/94, Miller v. Minister of Defense, 49(4) PD 94 [1995] (Isr.). 
 59 Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 540. 
 60 Ukeles, supra note 17, at 328. 
 61 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 115. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 116. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Ukeles, supra note 17, at 328. “[Miller’s] petition did not question the 
statutory arrangements applying to women’s service and, in fact, could not challenge 
their binding validity due to the constitutional tradition of the legislature’s 
sovereignty. It was confined to attacking the policy of the army, which rejected the 
possibility of volunteering for duties that had not been defined as open to women.” 
Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 541-42. 
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however, argued that the ban on women in the fighter pilot’s course 
was not a matter of discrimination for two reasons.66 
First, the prohibition was the result of the applicable legal 
standards and necessity.67 At the time, service in the Israeli Air Force 
required a voluntary extension of service and frequent and extensive 
reserve duty.68 Therefore, the military argued that due to women’s 
shortened compulsory service, the age-cap on recruitment into the 
reserves, and the prohibition from requiring mothers to serve in the 
reserves; women could not be counted on to complete the reserve time 
they initially volunteered for.69 As a result, the military would then have 
to train a higher number of fighter-pilots in order to maintain the 
needed number of pilots at all times; which would be cost-prohibitive 
due to the exorbitant cost of training.70 Second, the military argued, 
even if the court were to disagree with the military’s arguments, this 
was a matter best left for the legislature to decide, not the military or 
the courts.71 
Ultimately, in a decision three to two, the court ruled that the 
policy barring women from fighter-pilot training was discriminatory, 
declared the policy void, and ordered the military to integrate women 
into fighter-pilot training.72 In regards to the Defense Service Law,73 
the court acknowledged that the statute did make distinctions between 
men and women, however, the court found that the statute did not 
encourage or justify discrimination against women.74 One Justice even 
argued that sex-based discrimination of the type, in this case, affronted 
                                               
 66 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 117. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Ukeles, supra note 17, at 329-30. 
 69 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 116-17. 
 70 Id. at 117. At the time of Miller, the over-all cost of training a single fighter-
pilot was estimated to be over one million US dollars. 
 71 Id. at 117-18. 
 72 Id. at 118. 
 73 Defense Service Law, 1949, 1 L.S.I. 112, (1949). 
 74 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 118. 
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human dignity.75 Therefore, the military policy should work towards 
greater gender equality where possible.76 
The court also rejected the military’s arguments concerning 
logistics and budgetary concerns.77 In rejecting these arguments, the 
court determined that the military’s position rested only on 
hypothetical concerns about the cost of retaining women without any 
evidence.78 Even if integrating women into the fighter-pilot course 
proved to be expensive, the court found that in a democratic society 
such as Israel’s the society must be prepared to bear the burden of 
gender equality.79 
Even though the ultimate holding of the case was to allow 
Miller entry into the fighter-pilot’s course, Miller subsequently did not 
pass the entry process requirements and was disqualified.80 Yet despite 
Miller’s failure to achieve her own aspirations, the ruling has been 
hailed as a feminist achievement.81 First, the ruling removed a form of 
gender discrimination in an arena that has significant symbolic 
importance in Israel.82 Second, the ruling encouraged the military to 
begin opening more positions to women and broaden the assignment 
of women in reserve forces as well.83 Third, the Miller ruling influenced 
the legislature to include an amendment to the Equal Rights for 
Women Law regarding equal rights in the army, as well as a similar 
provision in the Defense Service Law.84 
                                               
 75 Ukeles, supra note 17, at 336. 
 76 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 118. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 543. 
 79 Seidman & Nun, supra note 18, at 119. 
 80 Id. at 120. 
 81 Barak-Erez, supra note 20, at 543. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 544. “The [Equal Rights for Women Law] was amended in January 
2000 to state that women-soldiers have rights equal to that of any male-soldier in 
carrying out any task in their military service except, where the essence and character 
of the role preclude women from carrying out its essential tasks.” Siedman & Nun, 
supra note 14, at 128. The Defense Service Law was amended to include Amendment 
11, “Equality in Service,” which “grants full equality to women in fulfilling their 
military service, with one qualification: the military is permitted to refuse to appoint 
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B. The United States’ Military 
1. From Minute Men to an All-Volunteer Force 
While the United States’ military is an all-volunteer force today, 
that has not always been the case. During the colonial period, the 
colonies adopted a militia system similar to the one used in England.85 
The militia system required all men, between the ages of sixteen and 
sixty, to be armed and ready to serve at any moment.86 Typically, the 
colonial governments would set quotas for each military district, with 
militiamen serving within their respective colonies for up to three 
months.87 If a campaign was expected to last longer than three months, 
volunteers would be taken.88 
During the Revolutionary War, the old colonial militia system 
became more stringent. Due to the need for more soldiers, the 
Continental Congress increased training days, limited exemptions, 
implemented more fines, and increased the terms of service to a 
maximum of three years.89 The Continental Congress then assigned 
quotas to each state and it was up to the states to meet the quotas.90 
The Civil War was the first time a successful national draft was 
implemented.91 Even then the draft’s reach was minimal.92 Draftees 
made up only about 50,000 to 100,000 men of the 2.5 million Union 
Force.93 It was not until 1916, when Congress enacted the National 
                                               
a woman to a military role if demanded by the nature and characteristics of that 
particular role.” Karin Tamar Schafferman, Milestones in Legislation and Judgements, THE 
ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE, (Mar. 5, 2008), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/9786. 
 85 Kaufman, supra note 10, at 195. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 197. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Kamens, supra note 6, at 710. 
 92 Id. at 711 (“Although conscription during the civil war was an emotionally 
charged issue, in actuality, the number of drafted men who served was relatively 
negligible”). 
 93 Id. 
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Defense Act, that a comprehensive draft policy was created.94 The 
National Defense Act allowed for an expansion of the army and also 
enabled the President to draft soldiers if the recruitment system failed 
to attract sufficient volunteers.95 
Later, in response to the growing threat posed by Germany, 
the federal government again enacted the draft in 1940,96 which existed 
for the next thirty years.97 Unlike previous drafts however, this draft 
allowed the President to provide exemptions for public health and 
safety, which tended to favor married men and farm workers.98 As a 
result, ten million men were drafted between 1940 and 1946.99 In 1948, 
facing the growing threat of communism, Congress passed the Military 
Selective Service Act (“MSSA”) to begin a peacetime draft.100 The draft 
was in effect until 1950, when the Korean War started. However, the 
act was not substantially changed during that time, it was only amended 
in 1951 to meet the needs of the war effort.101 The amended act 
continued many of the same exemptions used during World War II,102 
and drafted over 1.5 million men into service.103 
It was not until the Vietnam War that the draft became a focal 
point of public discourse. At that time, sixteen percent of the military 
was draftees, and of the men sent to Vietnam, eighty-eight percent 
came from the sixteen percent draft group.104 Further, it became 
increasingly clear to the public that wealthy and well-connected young 
men were able to take advantage of more draft deferments than their 
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poor, working-class peers.105 This resulted in heightened resistance to 
the draft. Due to the growing resistance, the last draft lottery was held 
in December 1972, with the draft law expiring in 1973.106 
In 1980, despite only a brief five-year hiatus, draft registration 
resumed107 in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan.108 President Carter believed that in resuming the MSSA, 
“[r]egistration . . . will improve our capacity . . . to increase the size and 
strength of our Armed Forces—and that capacity will itself help to 
maintain peace and to prevent conflict.”109 While President Carter 
requested that the MSSA be amended to include a registration 
requirement for women, Congress ultimately provided for a male-only 
Selective Service System.110 Congress chose to reject President Carter’s 
request out of fears of the cost of including women, women’s 
exclusion from combat, and the societal impact of including women.111 
Since that time Congress’ concerns have remained largely unchallenged 
resulting in a largely unchanged male-only registration requirement.112 
Now with threats of the draft falling farther into the past, the 
United States’ All Volunteer Force (“AVF”) has grown into a highly 
respected institution,113 totaling around 1.4 million servicemembers.114 
The AVF’s focus has evolved from merely obtaining as many able-
bodied personnel as possible to focusing on “attracting and retaining 
talented people to fill increasingly specialized roles in a smaller and 
more efficient military.”115 In order to better respond to disturbances 
around the world, AVF planning emphasizes rapid deployment of 
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smaller forces in strategic places,116 with an emphasis on “rapid 
strategic response, containment, coalition building and setting limited 
goals.”117 These developments have created drastically different armed 
forces in the United States than the armed forces of the past.118 As the 
form and function of the U.S. military evolve, so too should the role 
of women in the military. 
2. The Role of Women 
a. The History of Women’s Role in the Military 
While women have played a role in the United States military 
throughout history, the first permanent position for women in the 
armed forces was not created until 1901 when Congress created the 
Army Nurse Corps.119 During World War II, Congress also created a 
temporary Women’s Army Corps (“WAC”).120 After World War II, the 
passage of the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 
brought the first significant integration of women into the military.121 
However, the act placed significant limitations on women’s 
service. The act specified that women could comprise only two percent 
of the military; excluded women from draft registration, the draft, 
upper-level officer ranks, as well as combat positions; and allowed for 
involuntary discharge for motherhood and pregnancy.122 In 1967, 
Congress removed some of the limitations on women’s service by 
removing the two percent cap and opening all upper-level officer ranks 
to women.123 
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The greatest change to women’s role in the armed services 
came during the 1970s thanks in part to the growing women’s rights 
movement and the elimination of the draft.124 During that time, while 
the number of overall enlistment had decreased, the number of active-
duty women increased to over 120,000.125 By 1972, women could 
participate in the Air Force, Army, and Navy Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (“ROTC”)126 and in 1976, women were allowed into the military 
academies.127 Women were also qualified for noncombat aviation in 
the next year.128 
b. Rostker v. Goldberg — The Court’s Rejection of Drafting Women 
In 1980, the role of women in the military came to the 
forefront of American politics when President Carter requested that 
the MSSA be amended to include women.129 While Congress rejected 
President Carter’s request to include women in the amended MSSA, 
the Supreme Court added its voice to the debate in 1981. In its opinion 
in Rostker v. Goldberg,130 the Court discussed the issue of whether the 
MSSA violated the Fifth Amendment by authorizing the President to 
require the registration of males but not females.131 The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, relied heavily on judicial 
deference to Congress in matters of national security and a limited 
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to uphold the 
constitutionality of the MSSA.132 
Justice Rehnquist began by discussing the great deference the 
Court typically gives to Congress as a coequal branch of government, 
when it rules on the constitutionality of a congressional act.133 He 
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further noted that, not only is the Court ruling on the constitutionality 
of a congressional act, but that the case arises in the context of national 
defense and military matters, “and perhaps in no other area has the 
Court accorded Congress greater deference.”134 While Justice 
Rehnquist did concede that national defense and military matters did 
not automatically give Congress deference, he still found that the broad 
deference given to Congress in regards to the MSSA was not 
overreached.135 
In upholding the constitutionality of the act, the majority gave 
great weight to the congressional record.136 The majority noted that 
Congress’ focus was not on the traditional roles of females, but rather, 
the draft’s purpose.137 Congress found that registration with the 
Selective Service system was to provide a pool of able-bodied men for 
the draft, and the purpose of the draft was to resupply ground troops 
for combat.138 
Therefore, since women were barred from serving in combat 
roles, the majority agreed that only requiring men to register with the 
Selective Service System was “substantially related” to the important 
military interest in the draft.139 The majority found, 
[t]he reason women are exempt from registration is not 
because military needs can be met by drafting men. 
This is not a case of Congress arbitrarily choosing to 
burden one of two similarly situated groups. . . . Men 
and women, because of the combat restrictions on 
women, are simply not similarly situated for purposes 
of a draft or registration for a draft.140 
The Court concluded that, “Congress was certainly entitled, in 
the exercise of its constitutional powers, to raise and regulate armies 
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and navies, to focus on the question of military need rather than 
‘equity.’”141 Additionally, the majority went on to reject the idea that 
women could instead be drafted to fill non-combat roles because it was 
not worth the added burden.142 Volunteers could fill any non-combat 
roles, and staffing non-combat roles with only women would be 
harmful to military’s need to remain flexible.143 
However, the dissent argued that because the MSSA was 
founded on sex-based stereotypes only requiring men to register, the 
Selective Service system was unconstitutional.144 Justice Marshall, in 
particular, noted that in excluding women from the registration 
requirements, the majority, “categorically exclude[ed] women from a 
fundamental civic obligation.”145 He argued that even if the Court were 
to accept the combat limitation placed on women, there was no reason 
to assume that all fillable positions in the event of a draft would be 
combat positions.146 
Justice Marshall also pointed out that the Department of 
Defense had already recognized that in the event of a draft, there 
would be a need for support personnel and that women would be 
suited to filling those roles.147 Therefore, “there is simply no basis for 
concluding in this case that excluding women from registration is 
substantially related to the achievement of a concededly important 
governmental interest in maintaining an effective defense.”148 Even 
though the opinion appeared to be a set-back to women’s equality in 
the military, the military continued its slow integration of women as 
full service members.149 
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C. The Slow Evolution to Opening Combat Positions to Women 
Despite the setback of Rostker, women’s roles in the military 
continued to grow in the following years. Women led units in combat 
in 1989 in Panama, commanded Navy ships in 1990, and entered 
combat zones in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.150 Over 
40,000 women served during those operations, with thirteen women 
being killed and two taken as prisoners of war.151 These contributions 
slowly pushed the national conversation about women’s role in the 
military, forcing Congress to begin reconsidering its combat exclusion 
policies. 
In December 1991, Congress began its slow repeal of its 
combat exclusion policies by removing the prohibition on assigning 
women to combat aircrafts in all of the branches of the military, as well 
as creating the “Commission on the Assignment of Women in the 
Armed Forces.”152 The Commission was primarily created to “assess 
the laws and policies restricting the assignment of female service 
members.”153 Following the creation of the Commission, in 1993, 
Congress also removed the separate personnel systems for men and 
women and removed the combat ship exclusion.154 However, it was 
not a total removal because submarines and many other smaller 
combat ships remained closed to women.155 
In 1994, the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued the Direct 
Ground Combat and Assignment Rule memorandum (“Aspin 
Memo”), ending the “Risk Rule.”156 In its place, the Aspin Memo put 
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forth a new rule, the “direct ground combat assignment rule” to begin 
that October.157 The rule provided that “service members are eligible 
to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that 
women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade 
level whose primary mission is to engage in direct ground combat on 
the ground.”158 The new rule defined “direct ground combat” as 
Engaging the enemy on the ground with individual or 
crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile 
fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact 
with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground 
combat takes place well forward on the battlefield 
while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat 
them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.159 
The policy sought to find a balance between excluding women 
from roles with exposure to the enemy while still allowing military 
commanders to deploy soldiers in the most effective manner.160 
However, Aspin advised that the military services should “use this 
guidance to expand opportunities for women” and that “no units or 
positions previously open to women [would] be closed under these 
instructions.”161 
While the “direct ground combat assignment rule” was meant 
to keep women from the front lines, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
made it clear that women too were fighting and dying in combat.162 As 
a result of these service women’s efforts, the Department of Defense 
began conducting a review of its policies in regards to the direct ground 
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combat exclusion of women.163 It was not until 2013, however, that 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that the ban on women 
serving in direct ground combat roles would be lifted and began a study 
period for full integration into combat units.164 But the announcement 
did come with a caveat, it gave senior military officials until 2016 to 
request any exemptions to the new policy.165After almost three years 
of study, the new Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced that all 
combat jobs would officially be open to women with no exceptions.166 
Integration plans therefore had to begin by April 1, 2016.167 
d. The Aftermath and Resulting Debate 
In the three years since the “direct ground combat assignment 
rule” was lifted, women have already begun to make inroads into roles 
that have traditionally been left to men. Overall, the Army has begun 
to make gradual progress towards full gender integration. In April 
2015, the first gender integrated Army Ranger School class began 
training and by August 2015, Captains Kristen Griest and Shaye Haver 
became the first two women to graduate Ranger School.168 As of April 
2018, more than 600 women have been recruited for or transferred 
into combat positions, 12 women have graduated Ranger School, and 
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over 70 female officers have graduated the infantry or armor officer 
courses.169 
In contrast, the Marine Corps has not seen as much success 
with integration . As of April 2018, women only comprised about eight 
percent of the Marine Corps with only ninety-two women serving in 
combat arms positions, eleven of which are actually in infantry roles.170 
Further, women have struggled to pass the Marine Infantry Officer 
Course, with the first woman passing in only September of 2017.171 
While the Marines have retained segregated basic training, in March 
2018, the first group of women arrived at the Marine Combat Training 
Course after basic training for the first fully integrated unit and 
graduated that April.172 
Another area where women have struggled to meet the 
qualifications for entry has been in Special Operations Forces (“SOF”). 
While women have always served in units supporting SOF units, due 
to the extreme physical demands women are struggling to qualify for 
the SOF units themselves.173 However, there has been some progress 
and there remains the possibility of a woman someday serving in a 
SOF unit. While no woman has graduated SEAL training, two women 
were recruited for the training in 2017,174 and five women have been 
selected to begin the pipeline to become Tactical Air Control Party 
(“TACP”) specialists in the Air Force. Finally, one female Army officer 
has passed the selection process to join the 75th Ranger Regiment, 
becoming the first woman to join a special operations unit.175 
Despite these inroads, there are many that still argue that 
women should not be allowed to register with the Selective Service 
System, let alone serve in direct ground combat units. On February 4, 
2016, Representatives Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) and Ryan Zinke (R-
Mont.), both former service members, introduced the Draft America’s 
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Daughters Act of 2016 (“DADA”).176 The Act would have amended 
the MSSA to require women, like their male peers, to register with the 
Selective Service System upon turning eighteen.177 Congressmen 
Hunter and Zinke, however, did not support drafting women and 
opposed opening direct combat positions to women.178 They proposed 
this bill with the hope that it would trigger a debate in both Congress 
and the American public to reconsider women’s inclusion in combat 
arms.179 While some discussion in both the House and Senate occurred 
on the matter,180 the act was rejected and any policies requiring women 
to register with the Selective Service System were removed from the 
final version of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.181 
While Congress has chosen not to address whether women 
should be required to register, support for requiring women to register 
with the Selective Service System has grown. At the end of his last 
term, former President Obama announced his support for requiring 
women to register with the Selective Service System as the “next logical 
step” for women’s equality in the military.182 Even Secretary of the 
Army, John McHugh, General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the 
Army, and General Robert B. Neller, Marine Corps Commandant, 
have acknowledged that the last step to formal equality in the military 
is women registering for the draft.183 According to General Neller, 
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“[n]ow that the restrictions that exempted women from [direct ground 
combat] don’t exist, then you’re a citizen of a United States . . . It 
doesn’t mean you’re going to serve, but you go register.”184 
III. PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY IN ISRAELI AND AMERICAN LAW 
When examining the right to equality, one must assess two 
different approaches. The first is the formal equality approach, which 
defines equality as equal treatment of people that are categorically 
alike.185 Second, the essential equality approach relies on the premise 
that formal equality is not sufficient to achieve complete equality. This 
view surmises formal equality is not sufficient because it does not 
account for the fact that life imposes different conditions on 
individuals affecting their ability to achieve success.186 Therefore, 
essential equality seeks to equalize disparate conditions so that each 
individual has a chance at social mobility.187 While both American and 
Israeli approaches to sex equality rely on formal equality, Israeli law 
also relies on essential equality through affirmative action in both 
economic and social spheres.188 
A. Principles of Equality in Israeli Law 
Since Israel’s independence, the state has taken steps towards 
implementing gender equality through both legislation and regulatory 
actions covering both the public and private realms of Israeli society.189 
The first document to acknowledge women as legal persons who 
deserve equal treatment was the 1948 Declaration of Independence.190 
The Declaration states that Israel, “will ensure the complete equality 
of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, 
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race or sex.”191 However, this was merely a symbolic step towards 
gender equality because the Declaration of Independence bears no 
constitutional weight.192 Therefore, the statement is only a guiding 
principle of Israeli law rather than a legal mandate. 
But the Israeli government has passed other legislation in 
support of gender equality. In addition to the Declaration of 
Independence’s commitment to gender equality, Israel has passed the 
Women’s Equal Rights Law of 1951, “to ensure women’s equality in 
the legal system, ‘in the spirit of principles states in the Declaration of 
Independence.’”193 The goal of this law is to ensure that every woman 
has a dignified existence through guaranteeing access to “equality in 
employment, basic and higher education, health, housing,” as well as a 
woman’s right over her body and to be protected from violence and 
sexual abuse.194 However, the law is flawed in that it does not protect 
rights within families, it does not specify how equal pay or social rights 
will be achieved, and, because it is not a Basic Law (the Israeli 
equivalent to the Constitution), it does not have superior status in the 
law.195 
In practice, the legal system seeks to achieve equality through 
an “equality through difference” approach that purports to 
“appreciat[e] and accomodat[e] differences” between the sexes.196 This 
plays out through provisions in the law aimed at protecting women 
through creating privileges and exemptions, like legally mandated 
maternity leave and exemptions from military service.197 This special 
treatment of women is seen as equalizing socially unequal situations, 
while still protecting the societal need for women as mothers and 
caregivers.198 
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A woman’s ability to contribute as a mother and caregiver is 
central to the law because Israeli society was formed around a 
collectivist ideology where an individual attains status, rights, and 
privileges through their contribution to the society.199 The law did not 
develop around individual rights, but rather on how each individual 
could best contribute to society.200 A woman’s ability to reproduce was 
seen as a woman’s “incomparable and unique contribution as citizens 
of their state.”201 Therefore, the legal system was shaped around 
allowing women’s opportunities in the workplace while still 
“encouraging service to the state through motherhood.”202 
Women’s mandatory military service is a good illustration of 
the seemingly contradictory commitment to gender equality through 
preserving the woman’s place as a mother. In mandating mandatory 
military services for both men and women the state of Israel took a 
revolutionary step towards gender equality. But by providing 
exemptions to service for women centered around their familial role, 
the state also made it clear that the priority for all Israeli women should 
be motherhood.203 “This exemption from military service,. . . . [is] 
justified by the acknowledgement that women have a role in Israeli 
society that is, at times, considered more important than that of a 
worker—women as wives and mothers.”204 
This is why Israel has developed a legal system combining both 
formal and essential equality. If Israel had adopted a purely formal 
equality regime, special treatment of women through privileges and 
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exemptions would fail to protect women’s primary roles as mothers.205 
Thus, gender equality in Israel will only go so far as maintaining 
women’s place as mothers because “[t]he notion of equality itself is a 
social product, constructed out of already existing ideologies, practices 
and structures. The laws and legal theories that enforce a notion of 
equality tend to both reflect these already existing social norms and 
reproduce them.”206 However, in light of women’s status in the IDF, 
it’s questionable whether these privileges and exemptions actually 
operate to a woman’s benefit. 
B. Equality in American Law 
In contrast to Israel, American conceptions of gender equality 
focus on a theory of “sameness” between the sexes. This theory seeks 
to remove gender discrimination through “the removal of barriers to 
equal achievement and the eradication of discrimination.”207 This is 
achieved through the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
When examining Equal Protection challenges, the Supreme 
Court has used three standards of review. The highest standard is the 
strict scrutiny standard, where if a piece of “legislation implicates a 
fundamental right or a suspect class of persons, courts will strike down 
the law unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.”208 A much lower standard is rational basis review. Under 
rational basis review, if legislation “does not implicate a fundamental 
right or a suspect class of “discrete and insular minorities, courts will 
uphold the law so long as there is a rational basis for it.”209 
The third standard, which falls in between strict scrutiny and 
rational basis, is called intermediate scrutiny and is used to evaluate 
laws that have gender classifications.210 Intermediate scrutiny 
developed out of the recognition that “sex, as an unalterable trait, 
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should be considered a suspect classification under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”211 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, “a law 
that distinguishes between individuals on the basis of sex must be 
substantially related to an important government objective,”212 and the 
court must also determine “whether there is a way to further the State’s 
interest in a sex neutral way.”213 
While Craig v. Boren214 was the first Supreme Court case to apply 
the intermediate scrutiny standard to a gender-based classification,215 
arguably United States v. Virginia216 is the most famous, and for this 
comment, the most useful case to apply the intermediate scrutiny 
standard. In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the 
State of Virginia and the Virginia Military Institute’s (“VMI”) exclusion 
of women violated the Equal Protection Clause and mandated that the 
school open its doors to women.217 At the time, VMI was the only 
single-sex university of Virginia’s fifteen public colleges and 
universities.218 VMI’s curriculum focused on creating “citizen soldiers” 
through an “adversative” method of education.219 VMI did not accept 
female applicants because “coeducation would materially affect at least 
three aspects of VMI’s program—physical training, the absence of 
privacy, and the adversative approach.”220 However, the court found 
that while in certain circumstances physical differences between men 
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and women may justify differential treatment, such differential 
treatment “must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the 
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”221 
Therefore, in rejecting Virginia’s argument that VMI’s methodology 
would be unsuitable for most women, the court found: 
Generalizations about “the way women are,” estimates 
of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify 
denying opportunity to women whose talent and 
capacity place them outside the average description. 
Notably, Virginia never asserted that VMI’s method of 
education suits most men. . . . In contrast to the 
generalizations about women on which Virginia rests, 
we note again . . . VMI’s “implementing methodology” 
is not “inherently unsuitable to women.”222 
The Court’s opinion clarified that generalizations about most 
men and most women would no longer be sufficient to justify 
differential treatment and made it clear that gender based 
classifications would have difficulty carrying any legal weight. 
In addition to opening the doors of VMI to women, United 
States v. Virginia also further clarified the legal analysis required under 
the intermediate scrutiny test. The Court ruled that under the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, “[p]arties that seek to defend gender-
based governmental action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly 
persuasive justification’ for that action.”223 Further, the court ruled that 
an “exceedingly persuasive” justification is a high standard that rests 
solely with the proponent of the classification to demonstrate.224 For 
the proponent to meet this burden, it must show that “at least the 
challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and 
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.”225 Additionally, those justifications 
“must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
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capacities, or preferences of males and females.”226 In light of this 
standard, Rostker, and its “fixed notions” about women, should be 
called into question. 
IV. THE REQUIREMENT TO REGISTER FOR THE DRAFT SHOULD APPLY 
TO BOTH MEN AND WOMEN IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE EQUALITY IN THE 
LAW 
A. Women’s Selective Service Registration and a Parental 
Exemption Would be Consistent with the Equal Protection 
Clause 
With the above principles in mind, in order for American 
women to achieve full equality and share the burden of citizenship they 
should be required to register with Selective Service System. However, 
in order to protect the important State interest in the wellbeing of 
children and families, a parental exception should be added to allow 
both mothers and fathers to opt out of registering with the Selective 
Service System. To do so will give full weight to the Equal Protection 
Clause, allow women to share the burden of citizenship, and protect 
children and families. 
Should women’s draft exclusion be challenged, it does not 
appear the government would be able to present an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for such disparate treatment of men and 
women. In regards to women’s draft exclusion there no longer remains 
an “important government objective” in which the “discriminatory 
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives. 
Here, the important government objective is ensuring there is 
an able-bodied pool of individuals available in the event of a draft to 
replace fallen ground troops. The method to ensure this pool is 
registration with the Selective Service System. However, through this 
method the government discriminates between men and women in 
requiring men, but not women, to register. In Rostker, the Supreme 
Court rejected a challenge to women’s draft exclusion because men 
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and women were not “similarly situated” in regards to a draft because 
women could not serve in combat roles.227 However, after December 
2015, all positions in the military are open to women,228 removing the 
main motivating factor behind the Rostker decision. 
Now that women are no longer excluded from combat arms 
positions, it is clear that the “discriminatory means employed” are no 
longer “substantially related” to the achievement of an important 
governmental objective. Women and men are now “similarly situated” 
for the purposes of a draft, and therefore the “added burden” of 
including women in the registration system is no longer present. 
However, an argument could be made that the $8.5 million 
needed for the first year to register women, in addition to the $23 
million already in the Selective Service System’s budget, would be too 
cost prohibitive.229 But, an argument based solely on administrative 
concerns is not viable. If maintaining the Selective Service System truly 
is cost prohibitive then it is within Congress’ powers to abolish it 
completely. While abolishing the Selective Service System may be a 
better alternative to a gender-inclusive draft, if registration remains in 
place, it cannot continue to discriminate between men and women. 
Even though administrative and fiscal concerns are strong arguments 
to dissolve the Selective Service System, they are not viable arguments 
to continue women’s draft exclusion in the face of intermediate 
scrutiny.230 
However, to prevent a disruption within families in the event 
a draft is reinstituted, the government would not be in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause to include a parental exemption from 
registration with the Selective Service System. If such an exemption 
were only available for mothers, it is unclear whether such a distinction 
between mothers and fathers would survive intermediate scrutiny. 
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Further, such a distinction would place the burden of child care solely 
on the mother, which could reinforce “overbroad generalizations 
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and 
females.”231 
B. A Parental Exemption from Selective Service Registration Would 
be Integral to Promoting Gender Equality in the U.S. 
In Israel, “overbroad generalizations about the different 
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females”232 is expected 
in the legal system. The law is designed around affording women 
privileges and exemptions from certain duties in order to preserve their 
roles as mothers.233 In the military, it means shorter terms of service 
and exemptions from mandatory service if the woman is married, 
pregnant, or has children.234 While in theory, this may appear to be a 
positive step towards protecting women, it instead works to the 
detriment of women in two key ways. First, it perpetuates the 
stereotype that women are the sole caregivers within a family, instead 
of acknowledging the role a father could play in rearing his children.235 
Second, in limiting women’s service in the military, the law is actively 
removing the main avenue for advancement in Israeli society236 and 
“serves to lessen the value on women’s citizenship.”237 
This parallels America’s draft laws and highlights why an 
exemption from registration with the Selective Service System must be 
afforded to both mothers and fathers. Both mandatory military service 
and registering for the draft have the same underlying principles. One, 
to provide a pool of able-bodied individuals to protect the nation and 
two, to instill civic responsibility in the nation’s citizens. However, in 
distinguishing between men and women, Israel’s service laws have 
unintended consequences for women. Therefore, if a parental 
exemption from registration is not included, the Selective Service 
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System will have the same discriminatory results seen in Israel. If 
women could opt out of registering because they were mothers, the 
onus would be placed on women to care and raise children in the event 
of a draft. Further, it would signal that women’s service to their country 
is secondary to men, devaluing their citizenship and their ability to 
contribute to society. 
Therefore, should women become draft eligible, a parental 
exemption from registration would protect the strong state interest in 
preserving families in the event a draft is reinstituted. Further, it avoids 
the paternalistic results seen in Israel that work to the detriment of 
women’s inclusion in society. A parental exemption would prevent 
women from being forced into a maternal role and would allow them 
to actively participate in one of America’s most revered institutions. 
Additionally, such an exemption would pass the intermediate 
scrutiny test because it acknowledges the role mothers and fathers play 
in raising children avoiding “overbroad generalizations about the 
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”238 
Further, it would allow the parents to decide together who should raise 
their children, rather than defaulting to the traditional conception that 
mothers are the only caregivers. Thus, a parental exemption to the 
draft would be integral to promoting gender equality in the United 
States. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Women’s service in Israel’s and the United States’ militaries has 
evolved over time to the point where women in both militaries can 
serve side by side with their male peers. Given both the practical and 
symbolic importance of both militaries, this could be seen as a 
testament to the commitment both nations have made towards greater 
gender equality. However, in distinguishing between the service 
requirements of men and women, Israel’s laws work to the detriment 
of its women. While this may be an acceptable outcome in Israel, to 
protect a woman’s place as a mother, such disparate treatment of men 
and women is unacceptable in the United States. Therefore, if the U.S. 
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is truly committed to gender equality, the disparate treatment of men 
and women in draft registration cannot continue. In order to give full 
weight to the equal protection clause, men and women must both be 
required to register with the Selective Service System. To do otherwise 
would be to impermissibly discriminate between men and women. To 
take the U.S.’s commitment to gender equality even further, a parental 
exemption should be included to Selective Service registration, to 
afford mothers or fathers the choice to raise their children. To do so 
would further the principles of the equal protection clause and would 
prevent “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”239 
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